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Due Process Requires that the Party Against Whom Collateral Es-
toppel Is Asserted Must Have Been a Party to the Earlier Judg-
ment. Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973).
On March 9, 1967, a TWA jetliner and a small Beech Baron
aircraft collided in mid-air near Dayton, Ohio. The collision left
no survivors. The administrator of the estate of John S. Humphreys,
a passenger on the TWA plane, brought a diversity action in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
against the Tann Co., owner of the small plane. By an order of
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,1 the suit was trans-
ferred to the Southern District of Ohio for pretrial proceedings
consolidated' with actions brought by representatives of others in-
volved in the accident.' Upon completion of the discovery pro-
ceedings, one of the cases, Downey v. TWA, was set for trial on
March 21, 1971. There were no agreements that any of the trans-
ferred cases would be consolidated with or bound by the Downey
decision.' Following a verdict for Downey against TWA but not
against Tann, counsel for Tann successfully moved for summary
judgment in the pending case of Humphreys v. Tann on the ground
' In 1968, in response to the massive electrical antitrust cases, Congress cre-
ated the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. See Multidistrict Litigation
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-626, 82 Stat. 109, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1407
(1970).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1970) provides in part:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of
fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be trans-
ferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial pro-
ceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the . . . panel . . . upon
its determination that [they] will be for the convenience of par-
ties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct
of such actions.
'On March 23, 1970, thirteen actions were transferred to the Ohio District.
310 F. Supp. 798 (J.P.M.L. 1970). The Humphreys case was transferred to
join them on July 10, 1970. Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 667 (6th Cir.
1973).
"Civil Action No. 3521ML (S.D. Ohio, Apr. 7, 1971).
5 487 F.2d at 667.
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that Humphreys was collaterally estopped from relitigating Tann's
liability.' Held, reversed: Due process of law requires that the party
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party
to the earlier judgment. Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th
Cir. 1973).
The reversal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit was based on the due process requirement that a party may
not be bound by an earlier judgment unless he was either a party
or in privity to a party to the earlier litigation.! In terms of collat-
erally estopping a party on an issue previously litigated, the require-
ment traditionally has been applied to both the party asserting
collateral estoppel and the one against whom it is asserted. This
rule, known as mutuality of estoppel, essentially states that if both
parties are not bound by a prior judgment, neither is. Thus one
who was not a party or privy of a party to the earlier action may
neither be estopped by the prior judgment nor assert it in his fa-
vor.' The traditional mutuality of estoppel doctrine has been fol-
lowed in most jurisdictions. However, a deviation from the tradi-
tional rule was established in 1942 by the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia in Bernhard v. Bank of America.1 The so-called Bernhard
Doctrine established the notion that while due process of law re-
quires the person against whom estoppel is asserted to have been
a party to the earlier judgment," there is no compelling reason for
requiring that the party asserting the plea have been a party. 2 The
Sixth Circuit in Humphreys noted that even the more liberal Bern-
6 In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Dayton, Ohio, 350 F. Supp. 757, 768 (S.D.
Ohio 1972).
7487 F.2d at 671.
'RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942); 34 C.J.S. Judgments § 1405
(1924). For a discussion of the traditional mutuality of estoppel cases, see
Comment, Privity and Mutuality in the Doctrine of Res Judicata, 35 YALE L.J.
607, 608-09 (1926), and Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044, 1060 (1970).
9New Orleans v. Warner, 175 U.S. 120, 132 (1899); Litchfield v. Goodnow,
123 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1887).
10 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
11 Id. at -, 122 P.2d at 894.
"
2 Id.; Judge Traynor enunciated 3 pertinent issues in determining whether a
plea of res judicata was valid: "1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
identical with the one presented in the action in question? 2. Was there a final
judgment on the merits? 3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a
party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?" Id. at -, 122 P.2d
at 895.
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hard rule would not allow estoppel to be asserted against Humph-
reys, who had not been a party to the earlier Downey proceeding."
Although the Bernhard Doctrine does not precisely touch the
facts of Humphreys, it is significant because it served as an impetus
for the development of standards of fairness of estoppel that had a
direct impact on the district court decision. After Bernhard was
decided, there was concern for the uniform administration of jus-
tice in mass disaster cases. Commentators critically demonstrated
the vast difference between offensive and defensive use of estoppel
with the mutuality rule abandoned.' The defensive use of collateral
estoppel occurs in situations in which a losing party in the first
suit attempts to bring a second action on the same issues against a
third party, and the third party raises the judgment in the first suit
as a defense. 1 Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs in those
situations in which a losing party in the first suit is sued by a third
party who seeks preclusion of an issue on the basis of the decision
in the first suit." As a defensive maneuver, the assertion of collat-
eral estoppel creates the just and beneficial result of preventing a
party from relitigating an issue already determined against him
1"487 F.2d at 671. For a list of developments following Bernhard, see 53
CALIF. L. REv. 25, 38 (1965).
It might be noted that the Ohio state law followed the strict mutuality of
estoppel rule. The district court, however, ruled that the countervailing consid-
erations relating to the efficient administration of justice in the federal court
system, along with the pervasive federal influence in national airspace, called
for federal law to be applied. 350 F. Supp. at 760-64. The district court relied
on Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958),
rehearing denied, 357 U.S. 933 (1958), and Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965), to hold that:
a state rule need not be blindly followed in a diversity case where
the state rule is not integrally related to state created rights and
obligations but relates merely to the form or mode of enforcement
and a conflicting federal rule exists supported by a countervailing
federal policy which would be disrupted by the application of the
state rule.
350 F. Supp. at 761.
On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit found it unnecessary to determine
whether a federal law should be applied rather than the Ohio law since the
federal law did not conflict with Ohio law on the matter of the estoppel of
Humphreys under these circumstances. 487 F.2d at 668.
14 Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,
9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957).
'1 See, e.g., Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19
Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).6 See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d
944 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
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simply by picking out new defendants. ' The possible inequitable
result of offensive use of collateral estoppel, however, was pointed
out in the famous railroad accident hypothetical. 8 If fifty injured
passengers sued the railroad one at a time and offensive collateral
estoppel were available to each of them, it would be possible for
the railroad to win against twenty-five of the passengers and then
be estopped from defending against the remaining plaintiffs as a
result of an aberrational loss against the twenty-sixth plaintiff." In
other words, each victory for the defendant railroad is a victory only
against that particular plaintiff, whereas a single victory for any
plaintiff may be used by all remaining plantiffs to estop the rail-
road. Thus whenever a single defendant is sued by a group of
plaintiffs, offensive collateral estoppel would constantly work
against that defendant but never in his favor. The defendant could
not assert collateral estoppel against any passenger who had not
yet sued because to do so would violate the due process require-
ment0 that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted
must have been a party to the earlier action."
Offensive use of collateral estoppel has been permitted in certain
multiple-plaintiff situations since Bernard was decided" but its
17 Currie, supra note 14, at 292. Such defensive use of collateral estoppel was
also sanctioned in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Il1. Foun-
dation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), to prevent the holder of a patent that had been
previously determined invalid from having the validity of his patent relitigated
by simply suing new defendants unless it could be shown by the patent holder
that he had not been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter
in the prior suit.
's Currie, supra note 14, at 281.
1Id. at 285-89.
20 This "against-whom" requirement is automatically included in the strict
mutuality cases cited supra in notes 6 and 7, and was included even in Bern-
hard's relaxed version of the mutuality rule given supra in note 12. Due process
requires that no party be deprived of personal or property rights by a judgment
without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola
Co., 6 W.W. Harr. 124, 36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260 (1934). It is a universal prin-
ciple of jurisprudence that a person is protected from the operation of judicial
proceedings to which he is not a party. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 U.S. 277, 288
(1885).
21As stated previously, this due process issue was precisely the grounds for
reversal on appeal, as the District Court opinion allowed the plane owner Tann
to estop Humphreys, a passenger who had not yet litigated.
"Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944 (2d
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); United States v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962), a/i'd in part and modified
in part on other grounds, United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th
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application has been lirited, and even early critics of Bernhard
have applauded the reasoning and standards applied by the courts.'
The standard which has evolved, that there must have been a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the matter in the first action,' bal-
ances the interest of due process of law with that of judicial econ-
omy. Various factors should be considered in determining wheth-
er there has been a full and fair opportunity to litigate. If the par-
ty in the first action is fully aware of the implications of the ad-
verse judgment with respect to actions pending against him, there
is a presumption that he will defend the action as strenuously as
possible. In United States v. United Air Lines, Inc.' twenty-four
of thirty-one plaintiffs jointly litigated the liability issue in Cali-
fornia, and the remaining seven Nevada plaintiffs were allowed the
benefit of that judgment 8 because United Air Lines had had a full
and fair opportunity to defend in the primary action."'
A strikingly different situation arises, however, if the interest
defended in the first suit is much smaller than the interest in the
later action. In Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines
Ltd., 8 it was necessary to show willful misconduct on the part of
the airlines in order to receive damages in excess of the $8,291.87
provided for by the Warsaw Convention. After British Common-
wealth Pacific successfully defended against an action by the estate
of passenger Halmos, a new trial was granted and Halmos' estate
was awarded only $35,000 on a $500,000 claim. The second
action was by Berner and Lesser, administrators of the estate of
Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Desmond v. Kra-
mer, 96 N.J. Super. 96, 232 A.2d 470 (1967); Hart v. American Airlines, Inc.,
61 Misc.2d 41, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Guarino v. Mine Safety
Appliance Co., 31 A.D.2d 255, 297 N.Y.S.2d 639 (App. Div. 1969).
23 Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, 27-37
(1965).
24United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 725-26 (E.D.
Wash., D. Nev. 1962), afl'd in part and modified in part on other grounds,
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), petition for cert.
dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
2-216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962), afl'd in part and modified
in part on other grounds, United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th
Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
26 Id. at 729.
27 Id. at 728.
28 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965).
29 Id. at 534.
30Id. at 539.
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the noted pianist William Kapell. At the time of the conclusion of
the first action there had been no precedent for allowing the offen-
sive assertion of collateral estoppel by a non-party, 1 and the air-
line, unaware that it would later be estopped as against Kapell's
administrators, declined to appeal the relatively small Halmos
judgment." The court reasoned that it would be unfair to estop the
airline under the circumstances since it would certainly have ap-
pealed had it known the Halmos decision would be binding in Ber-
ner.3 Thus the prevailing notion is that one day in court is all that
a party is allowed so long as he had a fair chance to prepare and
present his case in a reasonably convenient forum, and he had full
awareness of the implications for other litigation of an adverse
judgment in the first case."4
The plaintiff in Humphreys, however, did not have a day in
court in the traditional sense,' and therefore the due process re-
quirement of Bernhard' that the party against whom estoppel is
asserted must have been a party to the previous action was not
fulfilled. Nevertheless, in Humphreys, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that regardless of
whether Humphreys had ever been an actual party to the Downey
proceedings, he could be estopped by that decision. In so holding,
the district court utilized a modified version of the "full and fair
opportunity" standard and found that in the section 1407 ' con-
solidated pretrial proceedings Humphreys had had a full and fair
opportunity to bring forth all the issues and facts and could allege
no errors to his detriment in the Downey decision.3 Thus, in the
31 Id. at 540. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d
944 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964), was decided after Hal-
mos, but before Berner. Zdanok established the principle that where a party
vigorously defends the first suit with full awareness of pending actions based
on the same facts, he may be precluded from relitigating against the pending
actions.
'2 346 F.2d at 539.
Id. at 540.34Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 955-56
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
"I Tann was the party asserting his prior victory in the Downey case against
Humphreys who had merely participated in pretrial with Downey's counsel pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, but had not been a party to the later litigation.
"' See note 12 supra.
",See note 2 supra.
Judge Weinman stated in 350 F. Supp. at 766:
This Court does not believe that the maxim that each man must
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district court's treatment of Humphreys, "full and fair opportunity
to litigate"39 was not only supplanted by "full and fair opportunity
to draw up the issues,""0 but also the new standard was used to
justify dropping the mutuality requirement for the party against
whom collateral estoppel was asserted.
While the facts of the case suggest that it could have been re-
versed on appeal without disturbing the new standard espoused by
the district court below, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit focussed primarily on the fact that Humphreys had not been
a party to the prior action. An alternate ground for reversal might
have centered around the fact that Humphreys was a tag-along
case." Although Humphreys was transferred five days before the
first pretrial meeting, that transfer order was given almost four
months after the original cases had been transferred.' Tag-alongs
have been transferred even after all the other cases are set for trial.'
Whether or not an individual litigant has been denied an equal
opportunity to participate in pre-trial proceedings should be de-
termined in each instance, but if the Sixth Circuit had desired to
leave any life in the new standard used by the district court, it
could have held that the danger to due process was simply too
be given his day in court is so inexorably fixed that it must man-
datorily apply where a careful evaluation of the record of pretrial
and trial proceedings in the prior action discloses that the absent
party was given full and complete opportunity to ascertain and de-
velop all relevant facts and to frame the issues during discovery
and the liability issue was adjudicated at a trial conducted in an
atmosphere free from errors in substantive, evidentiary and pro-
cedural law or trial strategy which if avoided would have changed
the result.
'9 Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 955-56
(2d Cir. 1964); United States v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 725-26
(E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962).
40 350 F. Supp. at 766.
4' Rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation defines a tag-along case as "a civil action apparently sharing common
questions of fact with actions previously transferred under Section 1407 and
which was filed or came to the attention of the Panel after the initial hearing
before it." 53 F.R.D. 119, 120 (1971). Rule 12 provides for a conditional order
of transfer to be made concerning a pending tag-along and the parties have 15
days to object to transfer before the conditional transfer order becomes effective.
The original transfer order was on March 23, 1970, and Humphreys was
transferred on July 10, 1970, five days before the first pretrial meeting. 487 F.2d
at 667.
13In re Air Crash Disaster Near Pellston, Mich., 357 F. Supp. 1286
(J.P.M.L. 1973).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
great when that standard was applied to tag-along cases. A second
ground for reversing under these facts without attacking the "full
and fair opportunity to draw up the issues" standard could have
been that the Downey jury, while exonerating Tann, had a second
party, TWA, on which to pin liability. On the other hand, the
only defendant in Humphreys was Tann, and it certainly seems
possible that the same jury would have assessed damages against
Tann had there been no other defendant in Downey. Despite these
alternative theories, the court of appeals invoked the broader
ground that collateral estoppel may be applied only against one
who was a party to the earlier action."
The reversal of the district court's decision will be welcomed by
those who have expressed criticism of application of section 1407
multidistrict litigation procedures to air crash cases." Although
some of the complaints have been remedied by modifications of the
Manual for Complex Litigation," some problems seem inherent in
the consolidation process itself. Critics point out that often it is too
costly and inconvenient for a plaintiff's attorney to travel to dis-
tant consolidated pretrial proceedings in order to participate fully. 7
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation answers such ob-
jections to transfer based on attorney's cost by referring to the
Manual's provisions for lead and liason" counsel, reliance on which
reduces the need for travel. " Yet it is the very plaintiff who has
been forced for practical economic considerations to rely on a dis-
covery package provided by lead or liason counsel who argues
4487 F.2d at 671.
4See Levy, Complex Multidistrict Litigation and the Federal Courts, 40
FORD. L. REV. 41, 49-50 (1971); McElhaney, A Plea for the Preservation of the
"Worm's Eye View" in Multidistrict Aviation Litigation, 37 J. AIR L. & CoM.
49 (1971). See also Beatty, The Impact of Consolidated Multidistrict Proceedings
on Plaintiffs in Mass-Disaster Litigation, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 183 (1972) and
Farrell, Multidistrict Litigation in Aviation Accident Cases, 38 J. Am L. & CoM.
159 (1972).
46The Manual for Complex Litigation is produced by a Board of Editors
of seven federal judges under the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center. It is
intended to provide guidelines rather than binding rules for multidistrict pro-
cedure. The 1973 edition addressed itself to the early complaints concerning
delays in discovery, unnecessary duplication in discovery, and more specific pro-
visions concerning lead and liaison counsel. See Note, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1001,
1006-08 (1974).
4 Beatty, supra note 45, at 187-88.
4MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §§ 1.90 & 1.92 (C.C.H. rev. ed. 1973).
41In re Grain Shipments, 364 F. Supp. 462, 462-63 (J.P.M.L. 1973).
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most vehemently that his own attorney's "opportunity" to partici-
pate with the other attorneys in drawing up the issues was in fact
minimal and that an estoppel based, as in Humphreys, on pretrial
participation, is a denial of due process."0
Reliance on lead and liason counsel is not always necessary,
however, and the urgent need to avoid constant repetition in the
judicial process where identical fact situations exist suggest that
collateral estoppel against non-parties should be determined on an
ad hoc basis rather than under iron-clad rules. Some commentators
suggest that non-parties should be bound in situations in which the
traditional reasons for refusing to allow non-party estoppel are
not pertinent and countervailing necessities for economizing ju-
dicial time are dominant." The reasons usually given for denying
the estoppel of a non-party are that he may have been precluded
from making certain arguments, using certain strategies, or choos-
ing his own attorney. Moreover, the interest of the party litigating
the issue in the first suit may not have been as great as the non-
party's and therefore the non-party may have presented his case
more vigorously." In Humphreys, however, the plaintiff's own at-
torney had participated in the fact-finding and issue-framing stages
in the very suit that was litigated and could allege no errors or
omissions made to his detriment. 3 The judge who had presided
over the earlier proceeding determined that the most forceful case
possible had been made against both the airlines by one of the
nation's leading attorneys, and that it would be a travesty upon
50 During the Senate hearings on the adoption of the Multidistrict Litigation
legislation, Senator Hugh Scott asked that a letter to him from Philip Price,
Esquire, be made a part of the record. As an attorney experienced in multi-
district litigation, Mr. Price expressed concern for constitutional due process:
As the number of cases and parties subject to mass handling in-
creases, the attention and respect given the positions of the smaller
parties or lesser interests in the litigation inevitably diminishes.
Such mass proceedings may well raise substantial constitutional
questions affecting, as they do, each litigant's right to have his case
handled by his own counsel and his right to due process.
Hearings on S. 3815 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in the Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 96
(1967).
51 Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion: Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 357 (1974);
Note, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1485 (1974).
"Note, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1496-97 (1974).
s' See note 38 supra.
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justice to have the issue relitigated." A further consideration is
the inherent unfairness of the multiple-plaintiff anomaly. If Tann
had been found liable in Downey, Humphreys could have used
that judgment to his benefit, yet the Court of Appeals refused to
make the Downey judgment binding simply because it went the
other way. By this reasoning, if Humphreys had sued both TWA
and Tann, he could have used the Downey finding against TWA
to his benefit while escaping the burden of the Downey exoneration
of Tann. This type of unbalanced use of judicial decisions damages
notions of legal symmetry and fairness and is magnified in situa-
tions that involve large numbers of plaintiffs. Under the facts in
Humphreys, a substantial question arises of whether the interest
of the non-party in not being estopped is as great as the interests
of the forum and the defendant in estopping him. The costly bur-
den of repeated litigation of the same issues when viewed in light
of the non-party's connection with the first suit indicates that due
process may have been satisfied for Humphreys in the first action.
Due process does not require particular forms or methods of
procedure. It is satisfied if reasonable notice is provided and there
is a reasonable opportunity to present claims, "due regard being
had to the nature of the proceedings and the character of the rights
which may be affected by it."" What is in fact a reasonable pro-
cedure for due process purposes is determined by a balancing of
the interests affected by the procedure." This balancing process
has not forbidden the estoppel of a non-party in all instances. Non-
parties are estopped, for example, if their interests have been valid-
ly represented in a class action by a competent attorney.57 Non-
parties are also estopped if they are found to be in privity with an
earlier party who litigated the issue." Although the traditional no-
tion of privity in this context contemplates an actual "successor
54 350 F. Supp. at 766.
" Missouri ex. rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40, 42 (1926).
56 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
17 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940). That a class member is a
non-party is the traditional statement, but in one sense a person who receives
proper notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2) and chooses not
to exclude himself from the class, may be considered a party.
" See cases cited note 9 supra.
1974] CASE NOTES
in interest"'" relationship, and a mere interest in proving the same
facts does not usually suffice,"0 a few recent decisions have attempt-
ed to expand the effect of privity to parties who had both a sub-
stantial connection with the earlier action and an identity of inter-
est in the issue litigated.' While most of these decisions have either
been overruled ' or do not establish a clear rule for collaterally
estopping a non-party," there is undoubtedly a growing recognition
59Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111,
128-29 (1912).
6o6d.; Sodak Distrib. Co. v. Wayne, 775 S.D. 496, 93 N.W.2d 791, 795
(1958).
"'See cases discussed in Vestal, supra note 51, and in Note, 87 HAv. L.
REv. 1485.
"' Makariw v. Rinard, 222 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1963), rev'd, 336 F.2d 333
(3rd Cir. 1964). In suit I, plaintiff automobile owner won damages against a
corporate defendant for the negligence of the defendant's garage employee. In
suit II the estate of the deceased employee sued the automobile owner who
claimed collateral estoppel based on the victory in suit I as a defense. The Third
Circuit, reversing, held that the employee's estate could not be bound without
a day in court.
Vincent v. Peter Pan Bakers, Inc., 186 Neb. 206, 153 N.W.2d 849 (1967).
A collision between two trucks occurred in which both drivers were killed. In
suit I the personal representative of driver A won damages against the employer
of driver B. In suit II the personal representative of driver B sued the employer
of driver A, who claimed estoppel by reason of the judgment against driver B's
employer in suit I. The trial court ruled that the first suit was conclusive. The
Nebraska Supreme Court reversed under the circumstances but stated,
It would seem to be entirely reasonable to allow preclusion against
non-parties to suit I so long as they are adequately represented and
protected in that suit. At this point there would seem to be a
weighing process involved. Considered should be the saving of the
time of the court, the adequacy of protection extended, and other
relevant variable factors.
153 N.W.2d at 850. The court was actually quoting from Vestal, Preclusion!
Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 IOWA L. REV. 27, 59-60 (1964).
6 Cauefield v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 378 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'g
247 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. La. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967). A
cemetery owner cleared brush from his cemetery, and forty-one relatives of
decedents buried there filed claims for cemetery desecration. In suit I a judg-
ment was rendered against the plaintiff, on a finding that no desecration had
taken place. In suit HI relatives of the plaintiff in suit I that had also testified
as witnesses in the first action sued the cemetery owner. The same lawyer that
litigated the first action represented the plaintiffs in suit II. Under Louisiana law
a finding of desecration of any part of the cemetery would have established a
claim for all the parties. The Fifth Circuit recognized that the Louisiana Civil
Code required an identity of parties for application of res judicata, but never-
theless allowed estoppel of the plaintiffs in suit II on a Louisiana common-law
concept of judicial estoppel. The court reasoned that since the plaintiffs in suit
II admitted that they could present no new evidence which was not presented
in suit I that they were judicially estopped.
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Byers Transp. Co., 355 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Mo.
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that full judicial proceedings should not be used as leverage by
parties who have declined to join an earlier action concerning their
interest."
Whether or not non-party collateral estoppel develops in other
areas of the law in which judicial efforts are needlessly duplicated,
different efficiency mechanisms have evolved in air crash multi-
district litigation proceedings which may make non-party collateral
estoppel unnecessary. The purpose of section 14075 is to avoid
repetitious discovery efforts and provide for the consolidation of
common fact situations into a single pretrial proceeding. It pro-
vides for the remand of the transferred case to the district from
which it was transferred, "at or before the conclusion of pretrial
proceedings, unless it shall have been previously terminated.' "' It
has been determined, however, that a summary judgment in the
transferee court is a valid part of the pretrial proceedings and
qualifies within the phrase "unless it shall have been previously
1973). In suit I a number of carriers had unsuccessfully attacked the validity of
refund orders issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission. In suit II the
plaintiff shipper, suing various carriers for the refund, alleged that the judgment
against the carriers in suit I was conclusive. The court noted that it was "not
clear whether all of the defendants in this action were plaintiffs in the [earlier]
action." Id. at 556. Estoppel was allowed however, on the basis that the de-
fendants had admitted in their answer to have been parties to the earlier pro-
ceeding, and that their interests had all been jointly served therein.
Colditz v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 329 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In suit
I crew members of an Eastern Airlines plane sued Trans World Airlines and
the United States for injuries arising out of a collision. The defendants impleaded
Eastern Airlines. There was a jury verdict for Trans World Airlines and the
trial judge exonerated the United States and dismissed Eastern Airlines. In
suit II, passengers of the Eastern plane sued both Trans World Airlines and
Eastern Airlines. Before trial the defendants moved to estop the passengers on
the basis of suit I, but the court denied on traditional due process grounds. After
the plaintiff's case was presented the defendants again moved for estoppel but
the court ruled that the passengers were entitled to rely on res ipsa loquitur and
thus should be allowed the benefit of any evidence which the defendants might
show against each other. The defendant airlines then declined to present evidence
and moved once again for application of estoppel. The court then granted estop-
pel for Trans World Airlines since there was no evidence to contradict the
evidence presented in suit I, but denied it for the benefit of Eastern Airlines
because there had been no findings with respect to Eastern in suit I that were
necessary to the judgment reached in that action. Although the estoppel in favor
of Trans World Airlines resulted from a balance of the evidence given in suit I
with no evidence presented in suit II, the decision of the jury in suit I had a
preclusive effect.
"Vestal, supra note 51, at 374.
5 See notes 1 & 2 supra.
"28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
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terminated." 7 Actually, the great majority of cases transferred
under section 1407 that are not terminated by a summary judg-
ment are never remanded but are disposed of in the transferee
court." The parties may stipulate to be bound by a test case," or
the transferee judge may bring the cases under his jurisdiction for
all purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a)"0 rather than solely for
pretrial proceedings under section 1407.71 Section 1404 (a) states
in pertinent part:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.
The transfer for all purposes under Section 1404 (a) is limited to
those cases which could have been brought originally in the trans-
feree district,"' but that limitation is not placed on section 1407
pretrial consolidations." This distinction means that if jurisdiction
and venue are improper in the district to which the cases are
67 Reidinger v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 463 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1972).
68 The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 IHv.
L. REv. 1001, 1017 (1974).
6" McDermott, A Plea for the Preservation of the Public's Interest in Multi-
district Litigation, 37 J. At L. & CoM. 423, 431-37 (1971).
7028 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970) provides:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.
71 Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation was amended in 1972 to read in part:
Each transferred action in the transferee court that has not been
terminated in the transferee court will be remanded to the trans-
feror district for trial, unless ordered transferred by the transferee
judge to the transferee or other district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
or 28 U.S.C. S 1406. In the event that the transferee judge trans-
fers an action under 28 U.SC. §§ 1404(a) or 1406, an order of
remand shall not be necessary to authorize further proceedings
including trial.
55 F.R.D. LI, LI-LII (1972).
For case discussion of 5 1404(a) transfers, see In re Silver Bridge Disaster,
311 F. Supp. 1345, 1346 (J.P.M.L. 1970), and Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d
122 (2d Cir. 1971).
72260 F.2d 317, 320-21 (7th Cir. 1958), aff'd 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
"8The criteria for S 1407 transfer is stated in § 1407(a):
[T]ransfers shall be made by the . . . panel . . . upon its deter-
mination that transfers for such proceedings will be for the con-
venience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and
efficient conduct of such action.
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transferred, the section 1407 consolidated pretrial proceedings
may be completed, but the cases may not be subsequently retained
for full disposition under section 1404 (a).
In air crash disasters, however, the transferee district is usually
chosen where the site of the crash is located," so that venue and
jurisdiction are proper ' and section 1404 (a) may be invoked by
the transferee judge to allow for full disposition." Although the
original function of section 1407 was limited to pretrial proceed-
ings," it is now recognized that since the actions may be transfer-
red by the transferee judge under section 1404 (a), the practical
result of a section 1407 transfer of air crash cases is a transfer for
all purposes."8 The transferee judge may then invoke rule 42 (a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
CONSOLIDATION. When actions involving a common question
of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint
hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions;
it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such
orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid un-
necessary costs or delay.
Thus, through the interplay of sections 1407 and 1404 (a) with
rule 42(a), the transferred actions may be consolidated into one
trial. Another method for a more economical usage of judicial
machinery in mass disasters may be the class action. Although the
legislative history indicates that the class action procedure was not
4 In re Air Crash Disaster at Tweed-New Haven Airport, 343 F. Supp. 951,
952 (J.P.M.L. 1972), and cases cited therein.
7- Almost any long-arm statute would allow exercise of jurisdiction, and venue
is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and (b) (1970), "in the judicial dis-
trict . . . in which the claim arose."
7" See note 71 supra.
7 The House Judiciary Committee stated that "the bill provides for the
transfer of venue of an action for the limited purpose of conducting coordinated
pretrial proceedings. H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted
in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1898, 1900 (1968). A proposal was rejected
that was designed to amend § 1407 by adding a § 1408 which would have given
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation the authority to transfer for pre-
trial and trial. See Hearing on S. 961 Before Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of State Comm. on Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 207
(1969).
18 Harris, Consolidation and Transfer in the Federal Courts: 28 U.S.C. S
1407 Viewed in Light of Rule 4 2(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), 22 HAST. L.J.
1289, 1326 (1971).
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intended to be applied to mass torts,"' it is often suggested that it
is especially useful in an air crash situation where all the cases
are identical and there are not individual defenses against each
plaintiff on the liability issue."0 With these efficiency mechanisms
available, the necessity of collaterally estopping a non-party as in
Humphreys seems less pressing in air crash disasters.
Humphreys v. Tann was a passing episode in the struggle to
administer justice in the most efficient way possible without in-
fringing on the requirements of due process. The appellate reversal
restrained the increasing trend toward adopting efficiency measures,
and the opinion seemed to echo the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham
who cautioned against placing too much emphasis on efficiency
even though he also was an early critic of the strict mutuality of
estoppel requirement:
One is tempted, however, to ask, whether justice be a thing worth
having, or no? and if it be, at what time is it desirable that litiga-
tion should be at the end? after justice is done, or before?"1
But there are those who contend that justice is done when certain
factors indicate that a party has had such a substantial connection
with the previous litigation as to have had a "vicarious" day in
court." As a leading commentor on the principles of res judicata
has recently stated in support of certain uses of non-party estoppel,
The courts seem to indicate an unwillingness to "play games."
There is a reluctance to allow courts and lawyers to go beyond
decision-making and engage in proceedings that are seen as repe-
titious and nothing more than a method by which lawyers are kept
7gThe Advisory Committee's Note to the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is or-
dinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likeli-
hood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability
and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals
in different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted
nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into mul-
tiple lawsuits separately tried.
39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966).
80Petition of Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624, 627 (C.D. Cal. 1972), noted in 40
J. AIR L. & CoM. 320 (1974). See also 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 1783 (1972).
91 J. BENTHAM, The Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 1972 (Bowring ed. 1838-1843).
12 Note, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1504 (1974).
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busy and courts are kept crowded, and which serve no socially
desirable end. In fact, repetitive proceedings are seen as socially
destructive-something which should not be allowed.'
It must not be forgotten that the balancing of traditionally accept-
ed due process requirements with the quest for judicial economy is
itself a process, the very goal of which is to attain justice. Useless
relitigation of identical facts and issues is contrary to the very notion
of justice, for delay, if acute enough, will destroy any possibility
for justice no matter what procedures are followed. This applies
to the litigants at bar as well as to those who await the precious
facilities. If the other efficiency mechanisms available in air crash
disaster litigation prove insufficient, non-party estoppel should be
applied under standards which balance the interest of the individ-
ual with the interests of society and maintain the purpose of achiev-
ing an optimum level of neither efficiency nor due process-but
justice. With the reversal of Humphreys on appeal, the collateral
estoppel precedents remain unchanged, but Humphreys v. Tann
provides a useful insight into the judicial approach to the perplex-
ing problem of mass disaster litigation.
Gary Crapster
AIR TRANSPORTATION-INTRASTATE CARRIERS-A Purely
Intrastate Carrier is Not Within the Jurisdiction of the CAB; Such
Regulatory Power Belongs to the States. City of Dallas v. Southwest
Airlines Co., 494 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43
U.S.L.W. 3345 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1974).
For many years the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth were engag-
ed in an intense rivalry for the business of commercial air car-
riers, and each city consequently constructed its own airport. In
1962 the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) 1 instituted an investiga-
"Vestal, supra note 51, at 374.
1 The CAB had jurisdiction in this subject by virtue of the fact that it could
have amended the carriers' certificates of public convenience and required them
to fly out of Love Field or a Fort Worth airfield. Therefore, to eliminate the
uncertainty of which airport would be selected, the cities agreed to build DFW.
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tion that resulted in a 1964 interim order giving the cities 180
days to arrive at a voluntary agreement to designate a single airport
to serve the area. If they could not reach an agreement, the CAB
would amend the certificates of the interstate carriers and require
them to serve either Dallas Love Field or Fort Worth's airport,
Great Southwest International Airport.' The cities agreed to con-
struct a new airfield and all interstate CAB-certified carriers agreed
to move to the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport (DFW) upon
its completion. Southwest Airlines, an intrastate commuter line
certificated by the Texas Aeronautics Commission (TAC)" to serve
Love Field, refused to move and was directed by the TAC to con-
tinue services there until told to do otherwise.' At trial before the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, the
cities argued that the CAB interim order of 1964 required them to
transfer all certificated air carrier services to the new regional air-
port, including those of Southwest Airlines.' Since Love Field has
received substantial federal assistance' it must be available for
public use without unjust discrimination." The problem, therefore,
is the determination of who will make these "just" discriminations
by use-classification. The United States District Court for the
Dallas-Fort Worth Texas Regional Airport Investigation, CAB Doc. No.
13959 (1962).
8City of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (N.D.
Tex. 1973).
'TAC has been given the unqualified authority to regulate scheduled intra-
state carriers. It is to consider the development of intrastate air transportation
which can properly be adapted to the needs of Texas. The TAC is to issue cer-
tificates of public convenience only after it has considered, among other things,
the effect it will have on CAB certified carriers. Municipal Airports Act, TEx.
RFV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 46c (1969).
S371 F. Supp. at 1021.
I1d.
In 1917 the United States Government established Love Field for the train-
ing of Air Force personnel. In 1941, the City of Dallas received $387,898 from
WPA for improvements at Love Field and bound itself to the federal govern-
ment by stating that it would devote the project to the public use without dis-
crimination. See Resolution of the City of Dallas (June 10, 1963). In 1950 and
1951 the City of Dallas received money from CAB to acquire land and for other
purposes. See CAB Project No. 9-41-106-001 (1950); CAB Project No. 9-41-
106-102 (1951).
849 U.S.C. § 1718(1) (1970).
9 City of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines Co., 494 F.2d 773, 776 (5th Cir. 1974).
The District Court considered several issues in this case. The Fifth Circuit nar-
rowed these issues to two: (1) Unjust discrimination and (2) the jurisdiction
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Northern District of Texas found that the CAB has no jurisdiction
over a purely intrastate airline, and that regulatory power over
Texas intrastate air carriers belongs solely to the TAC. Held,
affirmed: Southwest need not obtain a certificate from the CAB,
and the states have the power to act so long as there is no conflict
with federal law. City of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines Co., 494
F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1974),afl'g 371 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Tex.
1973), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3345 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1974).
In affirming the decision of the United States District Court, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit endorsed a
Texas Supreme Court decision which stated that in all matters of
flying safety, Southwest Airlines would be regulated by the Fed-
eral Aviation Agency (FAA), but that Congress has not pre-
empted the field of economic regulation of air carriers and South-
west therefore need not obtain a certificate from the CAB." Fur-
thermore, the decision as to where the public interest lies and what
air service is best for Texas must be made by the TAC."
The decision is supported by other cases dealing with the power
of the states to regulate intrastate activities." There have been no
unequivocal decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining
the limits of state regulatory control. Any doubts on the subject,
however, should be resolved in favor of state power. 3 In Southwest,
the Fifth Circuit and the district court both found in favor of state
power to regulate intrastate carriers, despite the assertion that
since Southwest Airlines' activities adversely affect interstate car-
riers, it is necessary that Southwest obtain a certificate from the
CAB."4 Of course, the power of Congress to regulate interstate
of the CAB. Of these two issues the most important and continually recurring
problem is that of the jurisdictional limits of the CAB.
10 Texas Aeronautics Comm'n v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 454 S.W.2d 199, 200
(Tex. 1970).
11Id. at 201.
12 People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 42 Cal. 2d 621, 268 P.2d 723 (1954);
Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 473 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See Shep-
pard, State-Federal Economic Regulation of Commercial Aviation, 47 TEXAS
L. REV. 275 (1969).
"8People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 42 Cal.2d 621, 268 P.2d 723, 737
(1954).
14 Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 473 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Texas
Aeronautics Comm'n v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 454 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1970);
see the Court of Civil Appeals decision of this case as noted in 35 J. AIR L. &
COM. 663 (1969).
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commerce is complete, and all commercial aviation arguably af-
fects interstate commerce to the extent necessary under the com-
merce clause to justify exclusive federal regulation." Even though
Congress has exerted power in various areas to the extent of reg-
ulating intrastate activities which adversely affect interstate com-
merce, 6 the CAB has ruled that its economic regulatory power:
does not include common carriage which 'affects' commerce be-
tween the states ... [T]he generally accepted opinion has always
been that purely intrastate operations are beyond the reach of the
power conferred on the Board by the Act even where such opera-
tions may be thought to burden interstate commerce by reason of
their adverse economic impact on interstate air carriers."
It appears that the CAB has exerted its jurisdictional authority
over intrastate activities which are wholly within the geographical
limits of a single state if it appears that the intrastate activity is
actually related in some way to interstate travel.'" Notwithstanding
this, the Board is presently willing to acquiesce in state authority
until such an interstate-related activity occurs.
In City of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines Co., the cities expressed
concern that Southwest's continued presence at Love Field would
induce the CAB-certificated carriers to maintain services there
and that there would result a loss of revenue at the new DFW air-
port. A retention of services by Southwest and these other carriers
at Love Field would result in a significant impact on the financial
security of the Regional Airport. Nevertheless, the district court's
rejection of this argument was affirmed by the United States Court
1 Sheppard, supra note 12.
16See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), in which the Court said
. no form of state activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power
by the commerce clause to Congress" . . . and such power . . . "extends to
these intrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with . . . the ex-
ercise of the granted power." Id. at 124. See also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964); Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153 (1962). "Congress
has power to authorize abandonment, because the State's power to regulate and
promote intrastate commerce may not be exercised in such a way as to prejudice
interstate commerce." Id. at 163. See also Houston, E. & W. Tex. R.R. Co. v.
United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1941), where the Court said, "Interstate trade was
not left to be destroyed or impeded by the rivalries of local government." Id.
at 350.
"CAB Order No. 71-6-79 (June 15, 1971).
'" See CAB v. Friedkin Aeronautics, Inc., 246 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1957).
'" City of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015, 1025 (N.D.
Tex. 1973).
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of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the CAB has consistently re-
fused to exert its jurisdiction over Southwest even in the face of
such revenue losses." In earlier cases dealing with federal admin-
istrative agencies' power over intrastate activities, the courts have
upheld an agency's jurisdiction even where the agency itself had
held it had no jurisdiction. 1 That is, when confronted with the fear
that an activity not within the agency's jurisdiction might have a
serious financial impact on and create substantial competition for
activities within the agency's regulatory power, the Supreme Court
has held that it was not Congress' intent to prohibit administra-
tive action to achieve the agency's ultimate purpose.' There can
be no doubt, therefore, that the CAB could assert jurisdiction
over Southwest Airlines due to the potential financial and compe-
titive impact Southwest would have on the other airlines within
the agency's jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the possibility of CAB
jurisdiction, the court in Southwest was correct.
While the jurisdiction established by the Federal Aviation Act
over safety matters is broad and has been asserted over all air op-
erations that directly affect interstate commerce," the jurisdiction
established for purposes of economic regulation has not been so
broadly construed or applied.' The economic regulations which
require CAB certification apply only to air transportation.' Air
transportation is defined by the Act as interstate air transporta-
tion.2" Interstate air transportation is further defined as the car-
riage of persons for compensation or the carriage of mail by air-
craft in commerce between a place in any state of the United States
20 It should be noted that since Southwest's refusal to leave Love Field, "de-
spite its contract, Braniff has refused to close operations from Love and Texas
International has now reopened there under the umbrella of a state court injunc-
tion." 494 F.2d 773, 775 n.1 (5th Cir. 1974). Twenty-five percent (25%) of
Texas International's business is in and out of Dallas. Texas International's (T.I.)
President has stated that if T.I. is denied the use of Love Field, while other
airlines are permitted to use it, T.I. will lose the commuter market between cer-
tain points. See Brief for Appellee at 9, the Fifth District Court of Appeals of
Texas, Docket No. 18377.
"See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
212 United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1967).
22Rosenhan v. United States, 131 F.2d 932 (10th Cir. 1942); United States
v. Drumm, 55 F. Supp. 151 (D. Nev. 1944).
24 Sheppard, supra note 12, at 276.
2349 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1970).
2649 U.S.C. § 1301(10) (1970).
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and a place in any other state." Judicial interpretation of these
provisions has emphasized that "nothing in this definition is di-
rected at activities which merely affect interstate commerce." 8
Since air commerce is defined in the same provision of the Act as
"any operation of aircraft within the limits of any Federal Airway
.. . which directly affect, or which may endanger safety in, inter-
state ... air commerce,"" it would seem that the absence of simi-
lar language in the definition of air transportation was intentional.'
The affirmation of the district court's decision by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Southwest is thus correct
in that Southwest Airlines should not be required to obtain a cer-
tificate from the CAB simply because its activities affect inter-
state carriers.
The United States Supreme Court early upheld an expansive
view of federal agency jurisdiction to carry out its ultimate purposes
despite the agency's inability to base its action on some specific
provision of the congressional act.2 The appropriate rule here is
that a grant of general rule-making power for enforcement pur-
poses should be extended only in situations in which there are no
specific provisions dealing with the activity concerned.' In the pro-
visions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Congress has specific-
ally granted the CAB broad regulatory jurisdiction over any activi-
ty which affects interstate safety operations ' and has deliberately
withheld from the CAB broad regulatory jurisdiction over eco-
nomic matters. That is, statutory stipulations for CAB jurisdiction
are specifically included in the safety regulatory provisions but no
2749 U.S.C. 5 1301(21) (1970).
1 Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 473 F.2d 1150, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
2949 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (1970).
3Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 473 F.2d 1150, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
See CAB v. Island Airlines, 235 F. Supp. 990 (D. Hawaii 1964). In that case,
the court observed that the CAB would have no control over intra-Hawaii opera-
tions not involving flight over the channel waters separating the islands. Id. at
1007. The CAB has stated that transportation by an airline within a state would
not be within the CAB's jurisdiction, but for very special circumstances (i.e.
flight outside the states for more than 2 minutes). CAB Order No. E-23958
(July 15, 1966).
" See United States v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 612 (1945), and
cases cited notes 18 & 19 supra. These cases can be distinguished from Southwest
in that the activities of Southwest are deliberately excluded from the Board's
jurisdiction.
"1 Cf. American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 141 (1957).
349 U.S.C. §§ 1302(3) and 1304(4) (1970).
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corresponding stipulations are provided in the economic regula-
tions portion of the Act.
Even though the House Report on the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938"' suggested that a narrow construction of the Act's terms
was not contemplated," the United States Supreme Court has hesi-
tated to hold that the Act has completely displaced all other exist-
ing regulatory bodies.' In Pan American World Airways v. United
States, Inc.," the Supreme Court, in dealing with the question of
whether the Civil Aeronautics Acte8 was designed to completely
displace the antitrust laws, refused to hold that "the new regulatory
scheme adopted in 1938 was designed completely to displace the
antitrust laws-absent an unequivocal declared congressional
purpose so to do."'" The Court in Pan American concluded that the
Justice Department had not lost complete jurisdiction to enforce
certain antitrust violations."0 Therefore, it is apparent that there is
perhaps enough latitude within the Act itself as well as its legis-
lative history to give the CAB jurisdiction over Southwest. How-
ever, these Supreme Court decisions indicate that the Court is not
willing to extend jurisdiction to the CAB in matters which are
not unequivocally provided for in the Act. Consequently, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Southwest is correct in concur-
ring with the Texas Supreme Court that "regulatory power over Tex-
as intrastate Air Carriers [is] ... reposed with the State of Texas," 1
and that "this constitutes Texas' exercise of its power to determine
14 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 60t, 52 Stat. 973 (1938), re-enacted as
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. S
1301 et. seq. (1970).
'5H.R. REP. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938) states:
It is the purpose of this legislation to coordinate in a single inde-
pendent aegncy all of the existing functions of the Federal Govern-
ment with respect to civil aeronautics, and, in addition, to authorize
the new agency to perform certain new regulatory functions which
are designed to stabilize the air transportation industry in the
United States.
8'See Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296
(1963); cf. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
37371 U.S. 296 (1963).
11 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938), re-enacted as
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
1301 et. seq. (1970).
39 371 U.S. 206, 305.
40 Id.
41 494 F.2d 773, 776 (5th Cir. 1974).
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that Southwest's is not an improper use of Love Field."'
The practical impact of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Southwest
is significant in that Southwest Airlines may stay at Love Field and
actively compete for Dallas passengers with the federally-regulated
airlines who may only use the less conveniently located airport,
DFW. It has been suggested that intrastate operators should supple-
ment, rather than compete with, federally regulated interstate air
transportation. ' Since our entire economic structure is founded
upon the theory of free enterprise, the better reasoning would be
to allow competition with federally regulated carriers since the in-
creased competition would provide a better and cheaper air service
on intrastate routes." The public is concerned with the operation
and regulation of air travel in two broad areas. The major concern
is safety. The public policy of insuring flying safety is therefore
uniformly regulated by the federal government. ' The second area
of concern is economics; the public must look to private enterprise
for public transportation. The users of air transportation, "the
travelers and the shippers, are interested in more, better, . . . and
cheaper transportation and regulatory policy should be directed
to the promotion of these goals." 6
Regulation of the aviation industry occurs at three levels of gov-
ernment, federal, state and local. Conflicting regulations should be
avoided and the courts should establish, from the earliest possible
moment, which regulatory agency of which governmental level will
govern so that inconsistent and burdensome regulations will not
endanger the air transportation field. Southwest is an indication
that the courts are not going to interfere, and it appears that only
congressional legislation can create a uniform federal regulatory
system. Even without legislation, however, the power of Congress
to promote, protect, and regulate interstate air commerce and
transportation is complete and clear. Congress may exert this pow-
'Id. at 777.
4See S. REP. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938) where it is stated:
Competition among air carriers is being carried to an extreme,
which tends to jeopardize the financial status of the air carriers and
to jeopardize and render unsafe a transportation service appropriate
to the needs of commerce and required in the public interest. ...
ISheppard, supra note 12, at 293.
"See note 23 supra.
"Ryan, Economic Regulation of Air Commerce by the States, 31 VA. L.
REV. 479, 507 (1945).
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er to the broadest extent possible even though its exercise affects
intrastate activities which would otherwise be within the control of
the state." In Wickard v. Filburn,"8 the United States Supreme
Court held that even though an activity may be local in nature it
can be reached by Congress if it has an economic effect on inter-
state commerce. Notwithstanding this power, Southwest indicates
that the court and Congress are not yet willing to extend the eco-
nomic power of the CAB to regulate purely intrastate air transpor-
tation. This unwillingness is the proper resolution of the issue be-
cause exclusive federal regulation of air commerce could create an
undesirable precedent that could lead to the impairment of state
regulatory control in various other public utility fields."9 Further-
more, the adoption of an exclusive federal regulation "is considered
by many to be repugnant to the Constitutional concept of state
sovereignty and the regerved powers of the states.","
As metropolitan areas continue to grow together and more con-
venient and centrally located airports are required, the significance
of Southwest will increase. Southwest indicates that the states have
the power to regulate the economic matters of purely intrastate air
carriers, even if those air carriers actively and successfully com-
pete with CAB-regulated carriers. The states' power to regulate
intrastate carriers is recognized even if new metropolitan airports
face significant revenue losses as does the DFW Regional Airport,
the airport involved in Southwest.
It is possible that if state regulatory power expands to the point
that competition between intrastate and interstate carriers is gross-
ly unequal,"' the courts and Congress will exert their potential jur-
isdiction and affirmatively act to curtail the state power. For the
present time, however, the states will be allowed to determine mat-
4 1Id. at 502; see also People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 42 Cal.2d 621, 268
P.2d 723 (1954).
48317 U.S. 111 (1942).
4 9 Ryan, supra note 46, at 505.
50 Id.
51 It is important to note that Southwest, and airlines that may develop who
will be in a similar situation, perhaps at this time have an unfair advantage. That
is, Love Field is conveniently located for residents of the Dallas downtown busi-
ness community who fly within Texas. DFW is approximately 45 minutes away
from the downtown area. Therefore, it seems logical that people flying intrastate
will use Love Field. Nevertheless, the courts and Congress are presently willing
to acquiesce and allow such competition.
CASE NOTES
ters of public convenience in economic regulations of intrastate
carriers. Southwest indicates that state regulatory bodies will not
only be allowed to supplement federally regulated routes, but will
be allowed to compete with the existing CAB-certificated airlines.
That is, Southwest indicates that purely intrastate operations are
beyond the reach of the power conferred on the CAB even where
such operations may burden interstate commerce due to the adverse
economic impact on interstate air carriers. Beyond this, Southwest
establishes a precedent, not heretofore considered by the courts or
Congress, which deals with the exanding metropolitan areas. Met-
ropolitan regional airports are not a thing of the future, but are
now a present day reality. As individual city airports are closed
down and metropolitan airports are built, the CAB will continue to
possess the power of amending interstate carriers certificates and
therefore require such carriers to move to less convenient loca-
tions. Southwest asserts that the CAB cannot amend the intrastate
carriers' certificates, which results in allowing the commuter car-
riers to retain a majority of the short-haul intrastate passenger
services. Not only will this result have an adverse impact on the
CAB-regulated carriers, but it could have an equally adverse im-
pact on the success of new metropolitan airports.
Michael L. Farley
ADMIRALTY TORT JURISDICTION-MARITIME NEXUS
-An Amphibian Plane Crash Into Harbor Waters Has a Sufficient
Maritime Nexus to Support Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction When the
Crash Occurs During the Takeoff Phase of the Flight, or Alternate-
ly, When the Flight is to be Primarily Over the High Seas Between
Two Territorial Islands. Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 355 F.
Supp. 683 (D.V.Is. 1973).
Hark was a passenger on one of defendant's amphibious air-
planes on a flight between two of the Virgin Islands. The flight path
was primarily over the high seas beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the Islands. Shortly after takeoff from the waters of an island
harbor, but before minimum control speed could be attained, one
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of the two engines failed, and the airplane crashed into the harbor
waters.' The statute of limitations on his common law tort action
had already run when Hark decided to bring an action to recover
for injuries allegedly sustained in the crash. Hark therefore brought
his action in admiralty for a maritime tort," which is only limited
by the flexible doctrine of laches. Defendant moved for judgment
on the pleadings and for summary judgment, maintaining that the
underlying claim was preeminently for an aviation tort that was not
cognizable in admiralty.' Held, motion denied: An amphibious air-
plane crash into harbor waters has a sufficient maritime relationship
to support admiralty tort jurisdiction when the crash occurs during
the takeoff phase of the flight before minimum control speed is at-
tained, or, alternatively, when the flight is to be primarily over the
high seas between two islands. Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 355
F. Supp. 683 (D.V.Is. 1973).
The admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts is grounded in
article III, section 2 of the Constitution, which states that "[t]he Ju-
dicial Power of the United States shall extend to . . . all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." In its original implementa-
tion of this constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts,
Congress made no attempt to define the scope of admiralty juris-
diction. The Judiciary Act of 1789 merely provided:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction exclusive of the
courts of the States, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction...
The federal courts have thus been left with broad discretion in
fixing the boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction, although Congress
Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 683, 684 (D.V.I. 1973).
2 Hark also pleaded two other theories of recovery: breach of an implied war-
ranty of airworthiness and breach of a contract for safe carriage. Id. at 685. The
court held that a breach of warranty action should be brought against the manu-
facturer or its distributors, rather than an airline. Id. at 688. The court also dis-
missed the breach of contract count, holding that personal injury is preeminently
a tort claim and should not be allowed to be brought in contract. Id. at 689.
3 Id. at 685. Admiralty courts rely on the concept of "unreasonable delay"
rather than on a definite period of limitation, but as a matter of convenience they
look to the analogous local statute of limitations to determine what a reasonable
delay would be. See Morales v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 208 F.2d 218
(5th Cir. 1953).
4 355 F. Supp. at 685.
' Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1333
(1970).
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has on occasion altered the judicial determination of the statutory
scope of admiralty jurisdiction.'
The Supreme Court's most recent and comprehensive pro-
nouncement on the scope of admiralty tort jurisdiction was made
in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland.' In Executive
Jet a jet aircraft that had been chartered to fly from Cleveland,
Ohio to White Plains, New York via Portland, Maine collided with
a flock of sea gulls seconds after takeoff from Burke Lakefront
Airport. The gulls were ingested into the aircraft's engines resulting
in an immediate loss of power. The aircraft settled just off shore in
Lake Erie after striking the airport perimenter fence and a pick-up
truck. Federal admiralty jurisdiction was invoked by the owners of
the plane in a suit to recover damages for the loss of the plane. The
alleged negligence consisted of a failure to keep the runway clear
of seagulls. The Supreme Court reviewed a long line of cases that
had held that admiralty jurisdiction over torts depended solely on
the "locality" of the tort; that is, if the tort occurred on or over
navigable waters, the tort was cognizable in admiralty." Since an
aircraft is able to move rapidly from a position over land to a posi-
tion over water or vice versa, the locality of an aviation tort is ex-
tremely difficult to determine in many cases and involves distinctions
which admiralty law is ill-equipped to handle For this reason the
Supreme Court concluded that a test of admiralty tort jurisdiction
based on "locality alone" was inappropriate for aviation torts, and
held that:
It is far more consistent with the history and purpose of admiralty
to require also that the wrong bear a significant relationship to tra-
ditional maritime activity .... [U]nless such a relationship exists,
I For example, the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740
(1970), extended admiralty tort jurisdiction to cases where damage to persons
or property on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water, thereby overruling
the result in The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866), where the Court held
that a suit brought to recover for damage to a wharf and several warehouses
caused by a fire that began on a ship anchored near the wharf on navigable
waters was not cognizable in admiralty.
7409 U.S. 249 (1972), noted in 39 J. AIR L. & CoM. 625 (1973).
8409 U.S. at 253-55. See, e.g., The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866);
Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963) (wrongful death
action arising out of an airplane crash into Boston Harbor held to be cognizable
within admiralty).
6 409 U.S. at 268.
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claims arising from airplane accidents are not cognizable in admir-
alty in the absence of legislation to the contrary."
Thus, Executive Jet established maritime locality plus maritime
nexus1 as the test of admiralty jurisdiction in aviation tort cases.
In discussing what kind of relationships to traditional maritime
activity would be considered significant, the Supreme Court weigh-
ed the petitioner's argument that a downed plane was analogous to
a sinking ship and, therefore, any aircraft crash into navigable
waters satisfied the maritime relationship requirement.1" The dis-
senting opinion in the Sixth Circuit's disposition of the Executive
Jet case made the same argument for the following reasons:
Problems posed for aircraft landing on, crashing on, or sinking into
navigable waters differ markedly from landings upon land .... In
such instances, wind and wave and water, the normal problems of
the mariner, become the approach or survival problems of the pilot
and his passengers."3
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that admiralty
law was molded to handle problems of waterborne vessels and to
deal with navigational rules that are
wholly alien to air commerce, whose vehicles operate in a totally
different element .... The matters with which admiralty is basically
concerned have no conceivable bearing on the operation of aircraft,
whether over land or water.'4
The differences between waterborne vessels and aircraft in terms
of the conceptual expertise of the law to be applied far outweigh
the superficial similarities between a downed plane and a sinking
ship. In particular, the causes of an airplane crash into navigable
waters, such as negligent aircraft manufacture or maintenance, are
almost invariably unrelated to the sea. Consequently, liability will
depend on "conceptual inquiries unfamiliar to the law of admiral-
ty."" for these reasons the Court concluded that the mere fortuity
"Id.
"Maritime nexus is used as a shorthand expression for the requirement in
Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), that the wrong
bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.
12 409 U.S. at 268.
"-1448 F.2d 151, 163 (6th Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion). See also Weinstein
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758, 763 (3d Cir. 1971).
14 409 U.S. at 270.
15Id,
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of an aircraft crash into navigable waters was insufficient to meet
the maritime nexus requirement," and held that, in the absence of
legislation to the contrary, tort claims arising out of flights by land-
based aircraft between points within the continental United States
could never support federal admiralty jurisdiction.' The Court,,
however, expressly reserved the question of whether, under any cir-
cumstances, an aviation tort could have a sufficient maritime nexus
to support admiralty jurisdiction. 8
"As if guided by a malign intelligence,"1 the aviation accident
in Hark fell precisely into the uncertain area!' left by the Supreme
Court's decision in Executive Jet. The flight in Hark was to have
been over international waters between two territorial islands by an
amphibious airplane, rather than between two points within the
continental United States by a land-based airplane, as in Executive
Jet. Consequently, the district court was faced with the question of
whether, at least under the circumstances of the crash in Hark, an
aviation tort could bear a sufficient relationship to traditional mari-
time activity to support admiralty jurisdiction.
Before this question could be decided, however, it was first ne-
cessary to determine what standard should be used to weigh the
sufficiency of an alleged maritime relationship. As the district court
in Hark pointed out, the purpose of the maritime nexus require-
ment was to screen out matters that were beyond the competence
of admiralty,"' thereby allowing admiralty law to be invoked only
when its expertise was relevant." Thus, the Hark court apparently
recognized that the sufficiency of an alleged maritime relationship
must be determined in each case in accord with the relevance of
admiralty expertise to the substantive issues of the case. 3
'
6 Id. at 270-71.
71d. at 274.
"Id. at 271.
19355 F. Supp. at 685.
2 I.e., aviation torts occurring during either flights by amphibian planes or
sea planes, or flights to or from a point outside the continental United States.
21 409 U.S. at 256.
22 355 F. Supp. at 686.
"Cf. Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973), where the Fifth Circuit
held that rifle fire, which was directed from shore at a small vessel on the Mis-
sissippi River and which injured the pilot, presented sufficient danger to maritime
commerce to override any state interests in the case; therefore, a federal court
of admiralty properly assumed jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit listed four factors
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The district court held that an amphibian plane crash had a
significant relationship with traditional maritime activity on two
different gounds.' The narrower ground upon which maritime nexus
was based was that the crash occurred during the takeoff phase of
a seaplane flight, which has a distinct maritime character.' The
court emphasized the fact that seaplane takeoffs differ in important
respects from takeoffs by land-based airplanes due to the maritime
nature of the "runway." While on the water a seaplane is subject
to the maritime rules of the road' and is faced with unique mari-
time dangers such as flotsam, ligan, and erratic boaters and snorkel-
ers. Even for some time after leaving the water a seaplane must
encounter special maritime hazards. For example, a seaplane may
have to maneuver around large ships anchored in a pattern deter-
mined by the harbormaster. Moreover, the enclosing hills which
make for a sheltered harbor and the calm waters necessary for a
seaplane takeoff pattern or funnel the winds into unexpected turbu-
lent streams."' Thus, the court reasoned that any seaplane crash
to be considered in determining whether there is a substantial maritime relation-
ship: 1) the functions and roles of the parties, 2) the types of vehicles and in-
strumentalities involved, 3) the causation and the type of injury, and 4) tradi-
tional concepts of the role of admiralty. 485 F.2d at 525.
24The district court's belief that aircraft and ship accidents should receive
similar treatment in the courts was set forth as a final policy consideration, which
the court felt supported both of its grounds for finding maritime nexus. 355 F.
Supp. at 687. Two reasons were given for this belief. The first reason was that
the legal terminology for analyzing aircraft and ships is sufficiency similar that
aviation and maritime law may be compared with profit. 355 F. Supp. at 688.
This reason, however, appears to be directly contradictory to the Supreme Court's
statement in Executive Jet that the concepts of admiralty law are wholly alien
to air commerce. See text at notes 11-15, supra. The second reason the court
gave in support of its belief was that aviation torts should be given the benefit
of the flexibility of laches because an aircraft crash is a complicated tort and,
like ship accidents, is followed by a lengthy official inquiry. 355 F. Supp. at 688.
The reason, however, involves a clear invasion of the province of the legislature
which established the statute of limitations for common law torts. Thus, the policy
consideration appears to be highly questionable.
1355 F. Supp. at 686-87.
216 Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 33 U.S.C. § 1061(a) provides
that:
Sections 1061 to 1094 of this title shall be followed by all vessels
and seaplanes upon the high seas and in all waters connected there-
with navigable by seagoing vessels, except as provided in section
1092 of this title.
27 355 F. Supp. at 686. It is difficult to see how the aviation hazards posed by
enclosing hills could be considered maritime. This is a good example of the court's
overemphasis of the differences between conventional takeoffs and seaplane take-
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which occurs before the plane leaves the harbor basin, reaches an
altitude sufficient to clear all surface shipping, 8 and attains speed
sufficient to maintain control of the plane in case of engine failure
has a sufficient maritime nexus to support admiralty jurisdiction."
In order to sustain admiralty jurisdiction, however, it was neces-
sary for the court not only to distinguish the facts of Hark, which
involved a seaplane takeoff, from the facts of Executive Jet, which
involved a conventional takeoff, but also to take the further step of
showing how admiralty expertise would be relevant to deciding the
merits of a seaplane takeoff case. The weakness, therefore, in the
court's first ground for finding a maritime nexus is that the question
of whether admiralty law is tailored to handle the peculiar issues
involved in claims arising out of seaplane takeoffs was forgotten in
the court's discussion of the great differences between seaplane
takeoffs and conventional takeoffs. Although it is well-established
that claims arising out of the operation of an amphibian plane,
while on the water, are cognizable in admiralty,"° this rule is based
on the fact that a seaplane, while on the water, is operating in its
secondary role as a waterborne vessel and its movements are sub-
ject to the maritime rules of the road. Hence, admiralty law and
expertise will be clearly relevant in determining liability. On the
other hand, it is difficult to see how admiralty expertise will be
relevant to claims arising after the aircraft has become airborne,
since an amphibious airplane is no longer subject to the maritime
rules of the road after it leaves the water." In Hark, for example,
there was no indication that the accident was actually caused by
any of the special maritime hazards discussed by the court. In addi-
offs at the expense of trying to show how admiralty law would be relevant to the
peculiar issues involved in claims arising out of seaplane takeoffs.
21 The plane had reached an altitude of approximately 200 feet at the time
of the engine failure. Id. at 685.
"I Id. at 687.
"oSee, e.g., Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Serv. Corp., 232 N.Y. 115, 133 N.E.
371 (1921) (opinion by Cardozo, J.). See also Lambros Seaplane Base v. The
Batory, 215 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1954).
3 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1509(a) (1970) provides that:
Except as specifically provided in sections 143-147(d) of Title 33,
the navigation and shipping laws of the United States, including any
definition of "vessel" or "vehicle" found therein and including the
rules for the prevention of collisions, shall not be construed to apply
to seaplanes or other aircraft or to the navigation of vessels in rela-
tion to seaplanes or other aircraft.
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tion, making the point at which the plane attains minimum control
speed," reaches a certain altitude, and leaves the harbor basin the
dividing line between maritime and non-maritime torts will result
in the creation of very difficult, peripheral factual issues and distinc-
tions which admiralty law is ill-equipped to handle. A better point
to demarcate when an amphibious airplane flight loses its maritime
nexus is the point at which the aircraft leaves the water.
If the first ground were the extent of the court's holding in Hark,
the decision would be relatively unimportant because it could be
confined to seaplane takeoffs. But admiralty jurisdiction was also
based upon a broader second ground, perhaps because the district
court recognized the weakness in its first ground. It was alternative-
ly held that a crash occurring during any part of the flight in Hark
would have a sufficient maritime nexus because the flight was to be
primarily over the high seas beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
Virgin Islands and the airplane was performing a function-the
transportation of mail, passengers, and freight between the islands
-traditionally performed by waterborne vessels. 3 In reaching this
conclusion the district court in Hark relied on the Supreme Court's
suggestion in Executive Jet that a mid-Atlantic crash of an air-
plane flying from New York to London might "bear a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity because it would be
performing a function traditionally performed by waterborne ves-
sels."' Moreover, the Court in Executive Jet recognized that if
maritime law were not applicable in the area of international air
commerce, recovery would depend on a confusing consideration of
difficult choice of forum problems, choice of law problems, and
international law problems.'
There are, however, two difficulties with the Hark court's re-
liance on the Supreme Court's hypothetical in Executive Jet. First,
the district court completely ignored the fact that the Supreme
Court also acknowledged Professor Moore's argument that even
a crash into international waters during an international flight
82 Note that minimum control speed (VMC) is an aviation concept which is
foreign to admiralty rules and concepts. It is the speed at which a twin engine
plane can fly on one engine.
TM 355 F. Supp. at 687.
84409 U.S. at 271.
Id. at 272.
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would not have a sufficient maritime nexus.' Moore pointed out
that if claims arising out of an airplane crash into navigable waters
during a transoceanic flight were cognizable in admiralty, the fol-
lowing anomaly would result. A person injured in the crash would
have a maritime tort claim if the plane went down before reaching
shore, but a non-maritime tort claim if the plane managed to re-
main airborne until reaching the shore, even though the cause of
the crash in both instances may have been the development of en-
gine trouble or pilot error that occurred at an identical site far out
over the ocean.3" According to Moore, this type of irrational dis-
tinction, resulting from the forced application of an inappropriate
body of maritime law to aviation torts, cannot be justified by the
difficult choice of law problems inherent in claims arsing out of an
international flight.' Moore concluded that "[c]learly, a maritime
connection does not exist in matters involving airplane crashes. ..,,8
and such matters should not be included within admiralty jurisdic-
tion.' A federal district court in Florida reached the same conclu-
sion as Moore with respect to the lack of a maritime nexus in air-
plane crashes in Horton v. J. & J. Aircraft, Inc." Horton involved
a libel for damages for personal injury arising out of a plane crash
into the Atlantic Ocean during a flight from Florida to the British
West Indies. Despite the fact that the crash occurred during an
international, transoceanic flight, the court found that it had no
maritime relationship.'
Secondly, even if the difficult choice of law and international law
problems arising out of the crash of an international flight into
international waters justifies the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction,
this justification is not available in Hark. The flight in Hark was not
81 Id. at 271 n.2 1. It is interesting to note that Justice Stewart apparently re-
lied quite heavily on Moore in writing the Executive Jet opinion. See 409 U.S. at
257, 259, 266, 271 n.21, 272 n.23.
'
7 7A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 330[5], at 3772 (2d ed. 1972).
8 d. at 3772-75.
I' id. 5 .325[3], at 3540.
" See Bell, Admiralty Jurisdiction in the Wake of Executive Jet, 15 ARiz. L.
REv. 67, 80 (1973); Note, Hops, Skips, and lumps Into Admiralty Revisited, 39
J. AIR L. & CoM. 625, 636 (1973).
" 257 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
'Id. at 121. The tort action, nevertheless, was held to be cognizable in ad-
miralty because the case was decided before Executive Jet and the court was
following the "strict locality" test of admiralty tort jurisdiction.
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international, being merely between two territorial islands, and the
aircraft did not crash into international waters. Consequently none
of the problems appurtenant to a claim arising out of an interna-
tional flight or a crash into international waters were present in
Hark. Therefore, the only support that remains for the alternative
ground for finding a sufficient maritime nexus in Hark is the fact
that the aircraft was performing a function traditionally performed
by waterborne vessels.
To justify a finding of maritime nexus solely on the basis that an
airplane is performing a function traditionally performed by water-
borne vessels is to reduce the maritime nexus requirement to an in-
flexible, mechanical rule based on departure and destination points.
Any airplane flying primarily over navigable waters could be said
to be performing a traditional maritime function of some sort.'
Consequently, if maritime nexus can be based simply upon the fact
that the airplane is performing a maritime function, any airplane
flight that is to be primarily over navigable waters and whose de-
parture or destination point is outside the continental United States
will have a sufficient maritime nexus per se. Such a rule makes the
superficial consideration of departure and destination points deter-
minative and results in meaningless distinctions. For example, an
airplane carrying passengers between Houston and Miami is also
performing a function traditionally performed by waterborne ves-
4' See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1974) (a cargo
plane transporting supplies from the United States to Vietnam was found to be
performing the functions of a freighter); Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357
F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973) (a helicopter transferring passengers between
shore and several offshore rigs was considered to be performing the ordinary
functions of a crewboat).
The reductio ad adsurdum of the "function" analysis is that even many air-
planes flying primarily over land are performing functions traditionally performed
by waterborne vessels. For example, the airplane in Executive Jet was carrying
passengers from Cleveland, Ohio, to New York, a function traditionally performed
by Great Lakes shipping.
I See, e.g., Teachey v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla. 1973). In
Teachey a Coast Guard helicopter enroute to St. Petersburg crashed just off the
coast of Florida after rescuing plaintiffs' decedent from a sinking shrimp boat in
the Gulf of Mexico. Plaintiffs argued that the crash had a significant maritime
relationship because the helicopter was performing a sea rescue function tradi-
tionally performed by waterborne vessels. The district court felt compelled to find
that there was no maritime nexus because the helicopter had refuelled in Key
West after the rescue operation before proceeding towards St. Petersburg, and
the crash therefore occurred during a flight between two points within the con-
titental United States.
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sels. Yet, should a crash into navigable waters occur, Executive Jet
would compel a finding of no maritime nexus because the flight
was between two points within the continental United States. In
terms of performing a maritime function, the only distinction be-
tween a flight between two territorial islands and a Houston-to-Mi-
ami flight is that traditionally the transportation of passengers be-
tween islands was exclusively performed by waterborne vessels
whereas there were other means of transportation between Houston
and Miami. Making such a spurious and irrelevant distinction the
basis for finding a maritime connection in the case of the inter-
island flight, while holding that there is no maritime nexus in the
case of the Houston-to-Miami flight, seems totally unjustified. '
The fundamental weakness in the second ground is that the dis-
trict court lost sight of what the court itself recognized as the pri-
mary concern in deciding the maritime nexus issue; i.e., will the
expertise of admiralty be relevant in deciding the merits of the
case? Since in the words of the Supreme Court in Executive Jet the
rules and concepts of admiralty law "are wholly alien to air com-
merce . . . "' it would be only in a rare case, such as a collision
between a ship and an aircraft, that substantive admiralty law
would be relevant to an aviation tort and a sufficient maritime re-
lationship would exist. Thus, if the relevance standard were applied,
the forced application of admiralty law to a case like Hark, which
has a number of superficial connections with traditional maritime
activity, but which will ultimately be decided on the basis of con-
cepts totally foreign to maritime law, would be precluded.
The Supreme Court in Executive Jet," as well as numerous com-
mentators," has suggested that Congress, pursuant to the commerce
clause, enact legislation providing for uniform substantive and pro-
cedural laws to be applied to all claims arising out of aviation acci-
dents, which would be specially adapted to the peculiarities and
" See Bell, supra note 40, at 77; Note, Maritime Locality Plus Maritime Nexus,
14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1071, 1088-90 (1973).
46 409 U.S. at 270.
47 Id. at 274.
41 See, e.g., 7A J. MOORE, supra note 37, at 3775-76; Sweeny, Is Special A via-
tion Liability Legislation Essential?, 19 J. Am L. & COM. 166(Pt.1), 317(Pt.2)
(1952). For a discussion of the attempts in Congress to pass a federal aviation
liability law, see Comment, Hops, Skips, and Jumps into Admiralty, 38 J. AR
L. & CoM. 53, 62-63 (1972).
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needs of air commerce. As long as Congress neglects to adopt this
ideal solution, however, the goal of developing a uniform body of
law to be applied to all aviation tort claims will not be furthered
by sporadically applying federal admiralty law to occasional avia-
tion tort cases. The holding of the Supreme Court in Executive Jet
gave the courts the opportunity to eliminate general maritime law9
from the morass of state and federal laws that now govern aviation
torts and thereby end an unwarranted intrusion of admiralty law
into an alien field. If followed by other courts, the unfortunate ef-
fect of Hark and its analysis of the maritime nexus issue in terms of
"function" will be the restriction of Executive Jet to flights pri-
marily over land. Thus, the opportunity to exclude aviation torts
from the jurisdiction of general maritime law will be lost, and the
door will be opened to extending admiralty jurisdiction over avia-
tion torts to much the same position it occupied before Executive
Jet.
Paul Price
41 General maritime law is the traditional body of maritime law implemented
by section 9, chapter 20 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See text at note 4, supra.
General maritime law must be distinguished from special statutory additions to
admiralty law that have been made since 1789 and whose applicability to aviation
accidents remains unchanged by Executive Jet. The Death on the High Seas Act
is an example of special statutory admiralty law that remains applicable to avia-
tion accidents, regardless of whether the accident had a maritime nexus. 409 U.S.
at 274 n.26.
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